Gender as a 3 Gender as a Situational Phenomenon in Negotiation
Over the past half-century, the psychological investigation of the role that gender plays in social behavior has evolved dramatically. The original wave of research started with the premise that gender would be reliably predictive of individual traits and behavior. An extensive body of research produced a small collection of significant differences, and a mountain of weak and inconsistent results (E. E. Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974) . In the seventies and eighties, psychological researchers offered a reconceptualization of gender as a social category as opposed to an individual difference (Deaux, 1984) . They explored the behavioral implications of masculine, feminine and androgynous identities (Sandra L. Bem, 1974 ; S. L. Bem & Lenney, 1976; Deaux, 1984) and illuminated how certain sex differences in social behavior stemmed from conformity with gender-based social roles (Eagly, 1987) . By the 1990s, the predominant theoretical approaches to gender in social behavior represented the view that gender effects were fundamentally context-dependent phenomena. Contemporary theories of gender in social behavior predict gender differences will arise only under certain circumstances and be absent in others, highlighting the importance of identifying situational variables that trigger gender effects (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Deaux & Major, 1987; E. Maccoby, 1990; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999) .
Psychological studies of gender in negotiation have not evolved with comparable momentum. Dismayed by the null and contradictory findings of the individual difference researchers (Bazerman, Curhan, & Moore, 2000; Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Rubin & Brown, 1975 ; Thompson, 1990) and, perhaps, reinforced by the feminist arguments of minimalist sex differences (Eagly, 1995) , psychological studies of gender in negotiation sputtered to a virtual halt by the mid-1980s (c.f., Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Gender as a 4
Meyer, 1998). One might conclude from this decline in research that gender is not relevant to negotiation behavior or outcomes. However, looking at the progress made in the study of gender in social behavior, one has to wonder whether the theoretical and methodological approaches that dominated early research on gender in negotiation might have obscured its importance. We embrace this latter perspective. Consistent with other psychological and organizational scholars (e.g., Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2002 ; Hannah C. Riley & Valley, 2002) , we propose that research on gender in negotiation should take into account the systematic influence of situational factors.
Gender as a Situational Phenomenon in Negotiation
The literature in social psychology suggests that there are two conditions under which we are likely to observe gender (as well as other individual) differences (Snyder & Ickes, 1985) . The first condition is when the behavioral demands of the situation are "weak" as opposed to "strong" (Mischel, 1977) . In strong situations, clear behavioral cues elicit uniform behavioral responses, which suppress the potential for individual differences, such as gender, to arise. In weak situations, behavioral cues are relatively ambiguous, and there is more potential for individual differences (if relevant) to produce distinguishable variation in behavior (Mischel, 1977; Monson, Hesley, & Chernick, 1981) .
The second condition is when gender is relevant and salient to behavior or performance expectations within the situation (Snyder & Ickes, 1985) . In situations where gender is salient and relevant to the behavioral response, men and women are cued to act out distinct genderbased scripts. These scripts come from social roles that prescribe what is appropriate or attractive behavior based on one's socially identified gender (Eagly, 1987; Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, Gender as a 5 2000) and/or from gender-based stereotypes that inform performance expectations (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Heilman, 1995; Steele, 1997; Towson, Zanna, & MacDonald, 1989) .
Motivated by the literature on gender in social behavior, we sought to test whether manipulations of the strength of the situation and the salience and relevance of gender would influence pre-negotiation aspirations (target prices) and negotiation performance (agreement price) in competitive bargaining situations. There is extensive research indicating that parties' prenegotiation aspirations are predictive of final performance (for reviews see Pruitt, 1998 ; H. C. Riley & Robinson, 2000) . We suspected that gender-based expectations about negotiation behavior or performance could influence parties' aspirations entering negotiation. We sought to test whether gender differences in negotiation aspirations and performance would be moderated by situational variables, and whether gender differences in performance would be mediated by gender differences in prenegotiation aspirations.
Strong v. weak situations:
Manipulating structural ambiguity. In attempting to manipulate the "strength" or "weakness" of the negotiating situation, we focused on the parties' perceptions of the economic structure of the negotiation. By economic structure we mean the zone of possible agreement (i.e., the parties, their interests, the issues to be resolved, and the parties' no-agreement alternative) and the potential coordination points for agreement (e.g., fairness norms, market values) (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1982; Schelling, 1980) . The economic structure is one of the most important defining characteristics of a negotiation, because it indicates to the negotiators what is the scope of potential agreement and what is the likely outcome.
We use the term "structural ambiguity" to characterize the relative degree to which parties know with certainty the economic structure of the negotiation (Hannah C. Riley & Gender as a 6 Valley, 2002) . If the negotiation is structurally unambiguous, then the parties know exactly where the potential for agreement lies and there is one mutually obvious solution (e.g., a 50-50 split or a recent price or salary precedent). As structural ambiguity increases, parties become unsure of where there is scope for agreement and what the appropriate standards for agreement should be.
We expected gender differences in competitive bargaining to be greater when structural ambiguity was high as compared to low. Under high ambiguity, we predicted that male (as compared to female) negotiators would report more optimistic performance targets and claim more of the surplus to be divided in mixed-gender pairs.
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These predicted gender differences in negotiation targets and performance were motivated by two bodies of research on gender in social behavior. The first established that women tend to have less confidence in their performance when engaging in traditionally masculine or male-dominated tasks (Beyer, 1990; E. Lenney, 1981) and that these relatively depressed performance expectations are likely to be fulfilled (Beyer & Bowden, 1997) . This effect diminishes, however, when male and female experimental participants are provided with clear (as compared to ambiguous) performance standards (Ellen Lenney, Browning, & Mitchell, 1980 ).
Competitive bargaining is more strongly associated with stereotypically masculine behaviors (e.g., being assertive, competitive, dominant, forceful, individualistic) than with stereotypically feminine behaviors (e.g., being sensitive to the needs of others, soft-spoken, sympathetic, understanding and yielding) (Sandra L. Bem, 1974; Hannah C. Riley & Valley, 2002) . If negotiators' perceived competitive bargaining to be a relatively masculine domain of negotiation, then we would expect to see male (as compared to female) negotiators reporting Gender as a 7 more optimistic target prices entering negotiation, and to see those relatively high expectations fulfilled in mixed-gender pairs. We would expect this effect to be significantly reduced if negotiators had clear information on appropriate performance standards. In other words, if structural ambiguity were reduced such that negotiators had stronger cues as to where they should coordinate on an agreement, then we would expect gender differences to decline.
The second relevant body of research is on the entitlement effect. This work has shown that women (as compared to men) tend to expect and to feel they deserve less compensation for equivalent labor (Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979; Crosby, 1982; Major, McFarlin, & Gagnon, 1984) . This "entitlement gap" dissipates, however, when experimental participants receive clear information on appropriate standards for compensation . If male (as compared to female) negotiators feel more personally entitled entering a negotiation, then this entitlement gap could have significant consequences for negotiation aspirations and outcomes (Major, Vanderslice, & McFarlin, 1984) . We would expect to observe male negotiators to have higher aspirations in terms of what they expect to receive from the negotiation and to claim more value from agreements in mixed-gender pairs than their female peers. We expect, however, if structural ambiguity were reduced to indicate a clear standard for agreement, that such gender differences would dissipate.
In Study 1 we tested the hypotheses that, in the context of a structurally ambiguous, competitive price negotiation, males would report higher aspirations and claim more value in mixed-gender pairs. We also tested whether gender differences in negotiation aspirations would mediate the effect of gender on negotiation performance. In Study 2 we manipulated structural ambiguity by either providing or withholding clear information on appropriate standards for agreement in a competitive price negotiation and tested whether the degree of structural Gender as a 8 ambiguity would moderate the predicted gender differences (favoring males) in negotiation aspirations and performance.
Salience and relevance of gender: Manipulating representation role. Consistent with the broader literature on gender and social behavior, we expected that manipulations of the salience and relevance of gender would also moderate gender differences. In developing our hypotheses for Studies 1 and 2, we suspected that the competitive bargaining context itself might heighten the salience and relevance of gender (because it is likely to be viewed as a relatively masculine domain of negotiation). We did not, however, test whether the relative competitive or cooperative potential of the negotiation had any bearing on gender differences. In Study 3, we sought to manipulate directly the salience and relevance of gender to the negotiation. We focused on representation role (i.e., whether you represent yourself or someone else), because it is a constant characteristic of negotiation contexts and one that we expected would trigger gender differences in negotiation aspirations and performance. It is also a variable that we could manipulate while controlling for the parties' incentives and perceptions of the economic structure of the negotiation.
We hypothesized that gender differences (favoring males) in aspirations and performance would be greater when negotiators represented themselves as opposed to someone else in a competitive bargaining situation. This hypothesis was motivated by two streams of researchone on the entitlement effect and the second on the social costs to females of engaging stereotypically agentic behaviors in work-related settings. Research on the entitlement effect suggests that women (as compared to men) experience a relative lack of perceived deservedness for compensation, but that this perception or feeling only applies to themselves personally and not to women in general or to men (Callahan-Levy & Messe, 1979) . This suggests that, due to a Gender as a 9 depressed sense of personal entitlement, women might aspire and ask for relatively less for themselves than they would for others. We hypothesized that women representing themselves would have lower aspirations entering negotiation and claim less value in mixed-gender negotiations than would women representing the interests of others. Congruently, we predicted that gender difference (favoring males) in prenegotiation aspirations and performance would be greater when the negotiators represented themselves as opposed to someone else.
Competitively demanding value for the self is also a stereotypically agentic (as opposed to communal) behavior, whereas competitively demanding value for others does not conflict directly with either masculine (agentic) or feminine (communal) stereotypes (Bakan, 1966; Eagly, 1987; M. E. Wade, 2001) . Research suggests that females tend to be evaluated more harshly than male peers when they engage in stereotypically agentic behaviors (e.g., selfpromotion, directive leadership) in workplace settings (Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Rudman, 1998; Rudman & Glick, 1999) . While there is some evidence that both men and women are viewed more favorably when acting in a gender-role consistent manner (Heilman, 1995) , men do not appear to be relatively negatively sanctioned as compared to women when they engaging in stereotypically communal behaviors in the workplace (e.g., participatory management) (Eagly et al., 1992; Rudman & Glick, 1999) . Applied to work-related negotiations, this research suggests that women may have more self-presentation concerns when negotiating for themselves than when they are negotiating on behalf of others. As Mary Wade writes, "The norms of modesty and selflessness prescribed for women may shape women's influence attempts such that they more readily engage in advocacy for others rather than for the self" (M. Wade, 2002) . This research also suggests that men are unlikely to be affected by a shift in representation role. This body of work on self-presentation concerns leads to the same prediction Gender as a 10 as stated above that female negotiators are likely to have higher aspirations and claim more value when they are in the role of negotiating for someone as opposed to themselves. Because males' self-presentation concerns are unlikely to be affected by a shift in representation role, we expected that gender differences (favoring males) would be greater when negotiators represented themselves than when they adopted the role of representing the interests of another.
Study 1 Our first study tested for baseline gender differences (favoring males) in the negotiators' aspirations and performance in a structurally ambiguous, competitive bargaining simulation. We also tested whether gender differences in aspirations would mediate the effect of gender on negotiation performance. The negotiation involved the out-of-court settlement of a lawsuit.
Pretrial bargaining fits well the definition of a structurally ambiguous negotiation, because the no-agreement alternative for both parties (i.e., court verdict) is uncertain and there are generally no uniform standards for agreement. Based on the case information provided, both plaintiffs and defendants had to subjectively estimate their own and the other side's reservation prices, develop their own performance targets, and devise appropriate standards for agreement. In prior classroom experience with this negotiation simulation, we observed substantial heterogeneity across negotiators in the performance targets they developed and across negotiation pairs in the outcomes they reached.
Methods
Participants. Participants were 1634 MBA students in a required Negotiation course at a large northeastern business school. The data were collected from classes conducted in 1994, 1995 and 1996 . Approximately one-third of the student body is female. Participants were sexcoded by name. 2 We analyzed results from the 275 pairs that consisted of mixed-gender dyads.
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Materials. The pretrial bargaining scenario involved a single-issue price negotiation over the settlement from a car accident. Participants were assigned to the role of the plaintiff's lawyer or the defendant's insurance agent, but they did not represent an actual person in the negotiation.
Each participant received confidential instructions for the negotiation, which contained role assignment information, a set of case facts, estimated trial costs, and settlement offers to date.
Confidential instructions did not specify reservation prices (i.e., maximum willingness to pay for defendants or minimum willingness to accept for plaintiffs) or specific settlement goals for either party. The parties had to subjectively estimate the bargaining range and set their own performance targets.
Procedure. There was random distribution of role and pairing assignments. Prior to negotiation, participants received the names of their negotiating partners and confidential instructions. Participants completed individual prenegotiation and joint post-negotiation surveys.
Prior to negotiation, participants reported their target settlement price. Participants conducted the negotiations face to face for course credit and with the knowledge that the professor would publicly debrief the results in class. Post-negotiation, participants reported whether they had reached agreement and, if so, at what settlement price.
Results
Table 1 displays prenegotiation target prices by role and gender for the full sample of mixed-gender dyads and for mixed-gender dyads that reached agreement. We used an alpha level of .05 for all statistical tests. Forty percent of the pairs failed to reach agreement.
3 Consistent with our hypotheses, for both roles in the full sample, male negotiators had significantly more optimistic performance targets than did their female peers (i.e., 11% lower for defendants and 8% higher for plaintiffs). The same pattern of results was repeated among those participants who Gender as a 12 reached agreement, but the predicted difference between the targets settlement prices of the male and female defendants was only marginally significant.
As predicted, males in mixed-gender pairs negotiated significantly better settlement prices (higher for plaintiffs, lower for defendants) than did females (30% better). The mean settlement price negotiated by male plaintiffs (female defendants) was $163,790 as compared to $125,751 negotiated by female plaintiffs (male defendants), t(162) = 4.67, p = .00.
The results of stepwise OLS regression analyses of agreement for the sample of mixedgender dyads were consistent with the hypothesis that target prices would partially mediate gender effects on negotiation performance. In step 1, the dummy variable for female plaintiff was significantly correlated with settlement price, standardized β = -0.34, p = .00, R 2 = 0.12.
With the inclusion of plaintiff and defendant target variables in step 2, the gender dummy variable remained statistically significant, but its effect size declined by 29%, standardized β = -.24, p = .00. The target variables were statistically significant, standardized β = 0.31, p = .00 for plaintiff target and standardized β = 0.40, p = .00 for defendant target (R 2 = 0.41). We tested the statistical significance of the indirect path between gender through target price to agreement price using Baron and Kenny's (1986) coefficient of mediation. The coefficient of mediation was significant for the plaintiff's target (p = .01), but not for defendant's target (p = .23).
Discussion
The results of Study 1 supported our hypotheses that males (as compared to females) would enter negotiations with more optimistic aspirations and achieve higher payoffs in mixedgender pairs. Gender differences in negotiated outcomes were quite large, with male negotiators reaching 30% higher outcomes than female negotiators. The gender differences in prenegotiation expectations partially explained gender differences in negotiation performance. However, after Gender as a 13 controlling for prenegotiation aspirations, there still remained a significant effect for gender on negotiation performance. These findings suggest that gender influenced not only how they approached the negotiation (through the goals they set) but also how they behaved at the table.
In Study 2, we manipulated the degree of structural ambiguity to test whether there would be a positive relationship between heightened ambiguity and gender differences in competitive negotiation. We collected the data in an experimental setting, where we could control for prior knowledge of and familiarity between negotiating partners and where we could provide participants a monetary performance incentive.
Study 2
Study 2 tested the effects of structural ambiguity on gender differences in negotiation aspirations and performance in a 2 × 2 (gender of buyer × high v. low structural ambiguity for buyer) factorial design. We manipulated structural ambiguity by altering the price comparison information available to the buyer in a single-issue price negotiation. In the high structural ambiguity condition the buyer had no price comparison information to use in setting a target agreement price; in the low structural ambiguity condition the buyer has specific and explicit guidance for setting an agreement price target. All pairs were mixed gender.
Prior to negotiation, we collected data on target price and an additional indicator of prenegotiation behavioral intentions: intended first offer. The literature on gender differences in social behavior suggests that males and females differ both in what they aspire to achieve (Beyer, 1990; Bylsma & Major, 1992; Heilman, 1995; E. Lenney, 1981) and in what they believe they are entitled to ask for (Bylsma & Major, 1992) . While target price and intended first offer tend to be highly correlated, it seemed worthwhile to test whether gender differences in specified targets would also manifest themselves in behavioral intentions.
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We predicted that when structural ambiguity was high male buyers would enter the negotiation with more optimistic performance targets and intended first offers than would female buyers. We anticipated that structural ambiguity would have a positive moderating effect on predicted gender differences.
Methods
Participants. Participants were 238 adults recruited from college campuses to participate for pay in an Interactive Decision-making Study during the 2000-2001 academic year. Because it was not possible to run all of the experimental sessions with only mixed-sex pairs, some participants were assigned to negotiate in same-sex pairs. Results from 53 same-sex pairs were not included in the analysis. We removed three cases from the analyses because one of the parties could not answer a pretest of the negotiating instructions (e.g., due to language barriers).
To minimize heterogeneity, we limited the data sample to young adults ages 18-30. We removed 12 cases in which one of the parties reported being older than 30. Materials. The simulation involved a zero-sum negotiation between a manufacturer (buyer) and a supplier (seller) over the price of halogen headlights. The bargaining range was bounded by the seller's $10/unit cost of production and buyer's alternative offer to fill the order at $35/unit. Confidential instructions informed the parties of their own but not the other side's reservation price (i.e., buyer's maximum willingness to pay and seller's minimum willingness to accept). Our experimental manipulation was embedded in the buyers' confidential instructions.
In the low ambiguity condition, the buyer's instructions stated that a comparable deal was made at $15/unit and that the buyer's superior "hoped that you would be able to negotiate a deal for $15." In the high ambiguity condition, the buyer's instructions had no specific price references other than the maximum willingness to pay (i.e., $35). In order to reduce the potential for gender Gender as a 15 differences on the seller's side, deal comparison information was provided for the sellers to estimate the value of a good deal. Prior testing of the seller's confidential instructions in classroom negotiations showed no gender differences in prenegotiation performance targets.
Procedure. Participants received a $10 show-up fee and earned a minimum of $5 for participating in the negotiation. If participants reached agreement, they received an additional $0.60 for every dollar per unit they improved upon their reservation price.
At the beginning of the session, the experimenter distributed packets containing participant numbers, confidential instructions and the pre-and post-negotiation surveys. The experimenter was blind to the ambiguity condition, but distributed packets discretely by gender in order to maximize the number of mixed-gender pairs. Participants had twenty minutes to read the confidential instructions and to complete the pretest survey. After finishing the pretest survey, participants filled out a prenegotiation survey on their target price per unit and intended final offer. In order to ensure that prior knowledge of their negotiating partners did not influence the participants' prenegotiation survey responses, the experimenter collected all prenegotiation surveys before pairing up the participants to negotiate. Any randomly matched pairs who happened to know each other before entering the study were reshuffled to negotiate with unfamiliar partners. Participants negotiated face to face for a maximum of twenty minutes. At the end of the negotiating period, the experimenter collected post-negotiation surveys from all participants. All participants were paid in cash before leaving. Table 2 summarizes mean results from Study 2 with one outlier removed from the sample. As predicted in the high ambiguity condition, the male buyers reported significantly lower (more optimistic) prenegotiation target prices (9% lower) and intended initial offers (16% lower) than did female buyers. Male buyers in the high ambiguity condition negotiated significantly lower agreement prices than did female buyers (21% lower). There were no significant gender differences in the low ambiguity condition.
Results
We conducted Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) to test the interaction of gender and structural ambiguity on prenegotiation targets, intended first offers, and performance. The effects of gender × ambiguity on buyers' prenegotiation expectations were directionally consistent with predictions and statistically significant, F(1, 102) = 2.87, p = .05, one-tailed for target price and F(1, 103) = 3.58, p = .03, one-tailed for intended initial offer. The effect of gender × ambiguity on final agreement price followed the same pattern of results. Mean differences across conditions were consistent with predictions and statistically significant, F(1, 103) = 5.75, p = .01, onetailed.
We found that in the high ambiguity condition, the buyer's target price and buyer's intended first offer partially mediated gender differences in negotiated outcomes. The coefficient on the dummy variable for female buyer declined by 9% when buyer's target was included in the analysis and declined by 19% when buyer target and buyer's intended first offer were included in the analysis. We tested the statistical significance of the indirect path between gender through target price and intended first offer to agreement price using Baron and Kenny's (1986) coefficient of mediation. The coefficient of mediation was marginally significant for the buyer's intended first offer (p = .07), but not for buyer's target (p = .27).
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Discussion
Study 2 supports the hypotheses that structural ambiguity moderates the effects of gender on prenegotiation aspirations, intended offer behavior, and performance in distributive bargaining. In the high structural ambiguity condition, males (as compared to females) entered the competitive bargaining scenario with significantly more optimistic performance targets and intended initial offers and negotiated significantly higher payoffs in mixed-gender pairs. With the benefit of clear price comparison information in the low structural ambiguity condition, there were no perceptible differences in the males and females' targets, intended first offers, or outcomes. The pattern of results was consistent with the hypothesis that prenegotiation aspirations and intended offer behavior would mediate the effects gender on negotiation performance, however, statistical tests were not significant. The gender differences in the high ambiguity condition replicated the findings from Study 1 with a non-MBA population and in a new negotiating context. 6 Study 2 builds on the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating the dampening effect of decreased structural ambiguity on gender differences in distributive bargaining. Study 2 contributes more broadly to our understanding of how situational factors can systematically influence the effect of gender on negotiation.
In Study 3, we tested another potential situational moderator of gender differences in competitive bargaining: representation role. In the first two studies, the confidential instructions indicated to the participants which role they represented in the negotiation (e.g., lawyer for the plaintiff v. insurance agent for the defendant in Study 1 or motorcycle manufacturer v. headlamp supplier in Study 2). It is unclear, however, to what extent the participants adopted those assigned identities during the negotiation. Responses to an exit survey distributed to Gender as a 18 experimental participants after Study 2 revealed considerable variation in the extent to which participants perceived or presented themselves as negotiating on their own or the company's behalf. One exit survey item asked, "What do you imagine the other person might think of you, if you kept insisting on a better price?" Participant responses ranged from "that I was interested in the benefits for my company" to "that I really, really wanted a low price so that I could get more money." It is possible in the Study 1, as well, that some acted as parties to a lawsuit and others as students fulfilling an assignment.
In Study 3, we controlled for representation role by having participants negotiate for themselves or as agents for other participants. We tested whether altering representation roles would trigger gender differences in negotiation aspirations, intended offer behavior, and performance in a structurally ambiguous competitive bargaining situation.
Study 3
Study 3 tested in a 2 × 2 (gender of seller × representation role for seller) factorial design whether shifts in representation role would trigger gender differences in competitive bargaining.
We manipulated representation role by altering whether the seller was negotiating his/her own wage (self-representation) or acting as an agent to negotiate the wage for another participant (other-representation). The sellers knew the minimum hourly wage they could accept, but had no wage comparison information to use in establishing an appropriate hourly wage for the work described. By providing reservation values and withholding wage comparison information, we replicated the high structural ambiguity condition in Study 2.
We predicted that women assigned to the role of negotiating on behalf of someone else would report more optimistic prenegotiation targets and intended first offers and negotiate higher payoffs than women negotiating on behalf of themselves. In the self-representation condition, we Gender as a 19 expected to replicate the findings from Study 1 and from the high ambiguity condition in Study 2. In the self-representation condition, we expected males (as compared to females) to set more optimistic prenegotiation targets and intended first offers and to negotiate higher payoffs in mixed-gender pairs. Congruently, we expected gender differences (male > female) to be greater when negotiators represented themselves versus others.
Methods
Participants. Participants were 194 students from Boston-area universities who signed up to participate for pay in a Scenario Study in 2001. To minimize heterogeneity among participants, we recruited undergraduate students only and asked all participants to show a valid student ID before entering the study. If it was not possible to run all the negotiations within an experimental session in mixed-sex pairs, some participants were assigned to negotiate in samesex pairs. Results from same-sex pairs were not included in the analysis. We analyzed data from 62 mixed-gender pairs. Thirty-two participants completed an alternative coding task while another participant represented them during the negotiation.
Materials.
The simulation involved a single-issue distributive price negotiation over the hourly compensation for a student (seller) for 20 hours of work redesigning the website of a small catering company (buyer). According to the scenario, the catering company seeks to contract the student through an agency that guarantees high-quality computer services at relatively low cost by recruiting talented undergraduates. The agency is an owner-operated, single-person business. The bargaining range was bounded by the minimum acceptable wage to the agency ($30/hour) and the company's best alternative offer for 20 hours of work by a freelancer ($55/hour). All roles had gender ambiguous names (i.e., Chris, Brett and Jamie), and the texts contained no gender-specific pronouns. Confidential instructions informed the parties of Gender as a 20 their own but not the other side's reservation price (i.e., buyer's maximum willingness to pay and seller's minimum willingness to accept). The confidential instructions for the seller contained no additional wage comparison information.
The role manipulations were embedded in the sellers' confidential instructions. The sellers' confidential instructions explained that, "Sometimes [the agency] has the students negotiate their own hourly wages with the clients, and sometimes [the agency owner] negotiates the hourly wage for them." In the self-representation condition, the seller's confidential instructions informed the participant that s/he was the student negotiating her/his own hourly wage with the buyer. In the other representation condition, the seller's confidential instructions informed the participant that s/he was the agency owner negotiating the hourly wage with the buyer on the student's behalf.
In order to make the role manipulation real (as opposed to purely fictional), the sellers in other-representation condition negotiated on behalf of another actual participant in the study. The confidential instructions for sellers in the other-representation condition explained that they would be randomly and anonymously paired with another participant, whom they would represent in the negotiation and whose compensation for participation in the study would depend on their negotiating performance. Participants who were represented by agency owners during the negotiation were informed them that the agency would negotiate on their behalf. These nonnegotiating students completed a survey during the negotiation. Importantly, the experimental manipulation held constant the participants' economic incentives across representation conditions by having the student and agency split evenly whatever money the student earned for working on the website. This was justified with the explanation that the agency provides students with work opportunities and guarantees technical Gender as a 21 assistance if the student runs into problems completing the work. In this way, the payoffs to the participants in the self-representation (student) or other-representation (agent) condition were identical: a 50-50 split of the compensation. By holding the sellers' economic incentives constant across conditions, the only difference between the self-representation and other-representation conditions was in social role as self-promoter or advocate.
The buyers had the same negotiating instructions across all conditions, with the exception that their confidential instructions indicated whether they would negotiate with the student or agency over the hourly wage. In order to minimize potential gender differences in prenegotiation Procedure. All participants received a $10 show-up fee and earned an additional $5 if they arrived at least five-minutes early. If participants or their representatives reached agreement, they received additional $1 for every dollar per hour they improved upon the negotiated wage (i.e., higher for the agent or student sellers and lower for the buyers).
In the course of obtaining the subjects' consent to participate, the experimenter explained that some participants would take part in a negotiation and that some would be represented in a negotiation by another participant in the study who would remain anonymous. The experimenter explained that those who did not negotiate would complete an alternative task and their payment for the session (apart from the show-up and early-show-up fees) would depend on the negotiation performance of their representative. In exchange for the participants' signed consent forms, the Gender as a 22 experimenter distributed packets containing participant numbers, confidential instructions, and pre-and post-negotiation questionnaires. The experimenter was blind to the role conditions, but distributed packets discretely by gender in order to maximize the number of mixed-gender pairs.
All participants had fifteen minutes to read the confidential instructions for their respective role and to answer a pretest of their understanding of the negotiating instructions.
After finishing the pretest, participants had another five minutes to complete a prenegotiation survey in which they described briefly how they planned to approach the negotiation and reported their target wages and intended initial offer. Participants who were being representing during the negotiation (i.e., non-negotiating students) were instructed to complete a survey that involved coding a series of work-related scenarios.
In order to ensure that the negotiators' prenegotiation survey responses were not influenced by knowledge of the identity of their negotiating partner, the experimenter collected all prenegotiation surveys before pairing up participants to negotiate. Any randomly matched pairs who happened to know each other before entering the study were reassigned to negotiate with unfamiliar partners. The negotiating pairs were spread out across a large lecture hall. The experimenter seated the non-negotiating student participants together in the front of the lecture hall. In order to control for possible effects of constituent gender (Pruitt, Carnevale, Forcey, & Van Slyck, 1986) , the experimenter assigned a mix of male and female participants to the nonnegotiating student role.
The pairs had a maximum of ten minutes to reach agreement. After ten minutes, the experimenter collected post-negotiation surveys and distributed exit surveys that contained a manipulation check of the extent to which participants perceived themselves as negotiating in their own self-interest or for someone else. Participants were paid in cash before leaving.
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Results
All pairs reached agreement. The correlation between negotiation targets and the wage was significant, Pearson r(61) = 0.59, p = .00, as was the correlation between the intended first offer and the wage, Pearson r(61) = 0.60, p = .00. As a manipulation check of the role conditions, a post-negotiation survey item asked participants, "To what extent were you acting in your own self-interest or on behalf of others in this negotiation?" Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = purely in my own interest, 4 = even mix for self and others, 7 = purely on behalf of others) and provided a brief explanation of their rating. The overall results were directionally consistent with expectations (self-representation mean = 3.03, standard deviation = 1.36; otherrepresentation mean = 3.12, standard deviation = 1.35), though there were no significant differences by role or gender. Small differences were not surprising given that the sellers' incentives were held constant across conditions. Some sellers also explained their answers to mean that they were partly representing the interests of their negotiating counterpart.
We checked whether the role information inadvertently influenced the buyers' prenegotiation performance targets and intended first offers. Buyers who were told they were negotiating directly with the student (as opposed to the contracting agency) reported significantly higher (less optimistic) target wages and intended initial offers, mean difference = $4.23, F(1, 61) = 8.42, p = .01 for target wage and mean difference = $5.30, F(1, 61) = 5.56, p = .02 for intended initial offer. This effect was not anticipated and will be important in interpreting the results for negotiated wages below. Table 3 displays both male and female sellers' average prenegotiation target wages and intended initial offers and their average agreement wages by representation role. Consistent with our hypotheses, female sellers in the other-representation condition reported significantly more Gender as a 24 optimistic target prices (14% higher) and intended initial offers (22% higher) than did females in the self-representation condition, mean difference = $6.21, t(29) = 2.06, p = .02, one-tailed for target price and mean difference = $10.98, t(29) = 2.11, p = .02, one-tailed for intended initial offer. However, there was no significant effect of representation role on female sellers' agreement wages, mean difference = $0.23, t(29) = 0.12, p = .90.
As predicted in the self-representation condition, male (as compared to female) sellers reported significantly more optimistic prenegotiation target wages (16% higher) and intended initial offers (also 16% higher) than did female sellers, mean difference = $7.10, t(28) = 2.50, p = .01, one-tailed for target price and mean difference = $7.60, t(28) = 2.05, p = .02 one-tailed for intended initial offer. Analyses of gender differences in agreement wage in the selfrepresentation condition did not support our predictions, mean difference = $0.50, t(28) = 0.38, p = .70.
We conducted ANOVA tests of the interaction gender and representation role on sellers' aspirations, intended initial offers and agreement wages. The effects of the role × gender interaction on sellers' prenegotiation expectations were consistent with predictions and statistically significant, F(1, 61) = 6.41, p = .01, one-tailed for target price and F(1, 61) = 3.47, p = .03, one-tailed for intended initial offer. The test of the role × gender interaction on agreement wages did not support our hypotheses, F(1, 61) = 1.07, p = .31.
Discussion
Study 3 provided some support for the predicted effects of representation role as a trigger of gender differences in competitive bargaining. The shift in representation role had a marked effect on the females' prenegotiation performance targets and intended first offers. In the absence of clear comparison standards, female sellers on average entered the negotiation intending to ask Gender as a 25 for 22% more per hour for someone else than they intended to ask for themselves. The role shift from self-promotion to advocacy prompted female sellers to aspire and to ask for more from the negotiation and closed the gender gap in performance targets and intended offer behavior. These findings suggest that the women did not lack confidence in their competitive bargaining ability, but either felt less entitled to demand value for themselves or inhibited by societal gender-roles from doing so.
The effects of the role manipulation on the sellers' prenegotiation expectations were not reflected in their negotiation performance. This lack of congruence was somewhat surprising given the long-established relationship between prenegotiation aspiration and negotiation performance (Fouraker, 1963; Pruitt, 1998) . We speculate that the performance results might be explained in part by two factors. First, the expected effect of role on female seller's agreement wages (self-representation < other-representation) may have been offset by the buyers' unanticipated favoritism toward the students over the agency representatives (causing selfrepresentation > other-representation). This favoritism is evident from the fact that buyers reported more generous (less aggressive) targets and intended first offers when they were told they would negotiate with a student seller as opposed to an agency seller. Perhaps, the participants, who were undergraduate students themselves, identified more strongly with and behaved more cooperatively toward those in the student versus agency role (Kramer & Brewer, 1984) . Second, in order to minimize potential gender differences on the buyer's side, we decreased structural ambiguity by giving them a clear negotiation target. In doing so, we may have constrained the range of likely agreement wages and thereby reduced the potential for variation in the sellers' targets and intended offers to affect the negotiation outcomes.
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Conclusion
The current research demonstrates that situational characteristics may systematically alter the effects of gender in negotiation. Under conditions of high structural ambiguity (i.e., lacking clear guidelines for evaluating what constitutes a good outcome), we observed substantial gender differences in performance targets, intended first offers, and negotiated outcomes. However, when we reduced that ambiguity by providing negotiators with a clear standard for evaluating their performance, gender differences diminished. Second, we found that whether negotiators represented themselves or others affected the extent to which women set ambitious performance targets and intended first offers. This situational approach contributes to the negotiation literature by advancing our understanding of when and why gender matters in negotiation. Grounded in the social psychological literature, this work helps the negotiation field to develop context-dependent models of the effects of gender on bargaining behavior and performance (Hannah C. Riley & Valley, 2002) . Our findings challenge global stereotypic presumptions of gender differences in bargaining competence with a more nuanced understanding of the way that aspects of the environment trigger gender-based behavior.
Future research needs to identify why gender differences in competitive bargaining emerged under conditions of relatively high structurally ambiguity and disappeared when ambiguity was reduced. While we did not explicitly measure the potential mediators, we can speculate about what may or may not have changed across the conditions. One possibility is that sex-stereotypic expectations with regard to competitive bargaining performance are more influential under high than under low ambiguity. Previous research has found that females' selfconfidence is moderated by the clarity of performance criteria for the task (Ellen Lenney et al., 1980) . It is also possible that increased ambiguity heightens self-presentation concerns, leading Gender as a 27 to more modest behavior on the part of female participants. A potentially complementary and, perhaps, more likely explanation than self-presentation is that providing explicit performance targets improves the outcomes of women relative to men because it raises women's sense of entitlement. Prior research has found women's entitlement to be low in situations where no appropriate comparison information is given . Future research should also strive to understand why women set less ambitious aspirations when representing their own interests than when negotiating for others. In our experiments, we cannot distinguish between the potentially mutually reinforcing factors of social-role-based impression management and depressed entitlement. Further investigation of the situational moderators of gender effects in negotiation should dig deeper into the causal mechanisms underlying these effects.
Finally, our research sheds light on the gender differences we observe in real world negotiations. Gender differences in salary, for instance, tend to be lower in more regulated industries (Robertson, 2001) and where information about appropriate salary standards is more easily accessible (Chang, 2000) . Historically, policy interventions to close the salary gender-gap have focused on abolishing discriminatory practices of employers. Our experiments suggest that another mechanism to help close the gender gap is the provision of better salary comparison information, thereby decreasing the ambiguity of standards for negotiated agreement.
New analyses we conducted further support the notion that structural ambiguity plays an important role in affecting gender differences in compensation in the field. We obtained data on starting salaries and guaranteed annual bonuses for graduating MBA students from a large Northeastern business school. The average starting salary for these students is $97,948 and the average guaranteed bonus is $48,272. Our dataset also included information about years of work experience, pre-MBA salary, job market activity (i.e., number of job letters sent and interviews Gender as a 28 and offers received), job location, functional area of job (e.g., marketing, finance, etc), industry of job (e.g., entertainment, finance, retail), and whether the candidate was returning to his/her pre-MBA job function, industry, or employer. In regression analyses controlling for all of these factors, we found that female MBAs accepted starting salaries that were 6% (approximately $6,000) lower than their male colleagues (standardized β = -.14, p = 00, n = 592, R 2 = 0.18).
However, when we replicated the same analyses with guaranteed bonus (as opposed to salary), we found a 19% gender difference with female MBAs earning about $11,000 less in bonus compensation than their male peers (standardized β = -.11, p = .01, n = 526, R 2 = 0.37).
MBA career counselors report that there is much less information available about appropriate levels of bonuses than there is about base salaries in organizations. The situation of negotiating for bonuses is more structurally ambiguous than is negotiating for salary. With relatively little information about appropriate standards for bonuses, it is possible that female students set their aspirations at lower levels than did the male students. As a result, the gender difference for bonuses was considerably larger than the gender difference for salary. We believe that these gender differences in MBA compensation are consistent with the results of our experimental research. We should use these findings to refine our prescriptive advice to negotiators to take into account the influence situational factors, such as the ambiguity of standards for agreement and the salience and relevance gender within the environment. In competitive (zero-sum) bargaining, there can be no gender differences in performance if one compares outcomes across same-gender pairs.
2
In all three studies the distinction between male and female is based on indicators of biological sex rather than sex-role identifications (Sandra L. Bem, 1974) . We use the term "gender differences" as opposed to "sex differences" because the latter connotes "stable dispositions rather than fluctuating patterns" (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998, p. 789). 3 Parties who reached an impasse had significantly more ambitious target prices than the parties who reached agreement, mean difference for plaintiffs = $39,425, F(1, 688) = 51.60, p = .00, and mean difference for defendants = -$37,751, F(1, 688) = 109.23, p = .00. 4 All participants received an exit survey that asked, "If there were any special circumstances that you believe influenced your survey responses or negotiation results, please explain them in the space provided below." Responses to this survey item suggested that substantial age differences between the participants affected their negotiating behavior. For instance, while the overwhelming majority of laboratory participants are students from local-area universities, there is a small minority of other community members (e.g., homeless people, senior citizens) who come to earn money in the experimental lab. In some cases where students were randomly paired with much older or evidently mentally ill community members, it was clear that the participants had modified their behavior in reaction to their negotiating partner (e.g., reporting being generous or deferential to an "old lady"). To control for such heterogeneity, we limited the sample to young adults (i.e., ages 18-30 years of age).
5
The observation was identified as an outlier using the box-plot fence method for identifying outliers (i.e., | x -25 th percentile | ≥ 1.5 quartile range). The recorded response on Gender as a 37 intended initial offer was $5, whereas the female buyer-high ambiguity condition mean = 22.24, standard deviation = 6.65. With the outlier case included, nonparametric tests of differences in populations supported predicted gender differences in the high ambiguity condition. With the outlier case included, t-tests of predicted gender differences in the high ambiguity condition were marginally significant for intended initial offer, t(47) = 1.57, p = .06, one-tailed. The results reported were not otherwise altered (either qualitatively or quantitatively) by the inclusion or exclusion of this outlier. 6 We replicated Study 2 in a classroom experiment with MBA students, but were unable to collect data on pre-negotiation expectations. The effect of gender × ambiguity on negotiation performance was consistent with predictions and statistically significant. Tables are available from the authors upon request.
Gender as a 38 Note: Significance levels are one-tailed and apply to predicted within-role gender differences.
Gender as a 39 One female participant in the high-ambiguity condition responded "I don't know" to the prenegotiation survey item on target price. In the low ambiguity condition, there were no significant gender differences in prenegotiation expectations, p > .50 for Target Price and Intended Offer. There was a marginally significant effect for gender in the predicted direction for Agreement Price, p < .10, one-tailed.
Gender as a 40 In the other-representation condition, there were no significant gender differences in prenegotiation expectations, p > .10 for Target Price, Intended Offer and Agreement Wage.
